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Is it Hot in Here or is it Just Me?: A Call for Menopause Equity in the
Workplace
By Leslie Mullins
Introduction
In a society where many topics related to female reproduction are considered taboo,
menopause is especially stigmatized because of its intersection with age and a perception that a
woman’s value ends with her reproductive ability.1 As described by Gail Sheehy (“Sheehy”) in
The Silent Passage, menopause is “one of the most misunderstood passages in a woman's life.” 2
Menopause causes shame and stigma because of its association with middle age in a culture
obsessed with youth.3 The failure of courts to extend available protections to claims related to
menopause denies millions of working persons protections from unlawful discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”).4
Generally, legal protections have not been extended to claims of employment
discrimination due to menopause. While the ADA’s scope of protection from employment
discrimination would seem to encompass severe symptoms of menopause as a disability that
substantially limits one or more “major life activities,” courts have consistently held that
menopause is not a cognizable disability under the ADA.5 While Title VII prohibits discrimination

1

Issues related to menstruation, and its cessation, predominantly, but not exclusively, affect women. However,
transgender men and boys may also be menstruators and, therefore, may experience menopause. Viewing menopause
as an issue unique to “women” unjustly ignores menstruators who are not cis-gender women. This paper generally
uses the term “menstruator” to describe persons who experience menopause; however, in some cases, “women” is
used based on historical context. See Margaret E. Johnson, Menstrual Justice, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 9 (2019).
2
Gail Sheehy, THE SILENT PASSAGE: MENOPAUSE 3 (1991).
3
Id.
4
42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 621.
5
See e.g., McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D. Minn. 1998); Klein v. Dep’t of Children
and Families Servs., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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on the basis of sex, and was amended to clarify that “because of sex” encompasses female
reproduction issues, the courts have consistently rejected claims of discrimination because of
menopause.6 Additionally, because menopause, either with or without physical symptoms, is
usually perceived as a condition unique to older women, many employee-menstruators face
intersectional discrimination against women and older workers. The movements for menstrual
justice, feminist jurisprudence, rights for the aged, and others have helped raise awareness of legal
issues related to menopause. 7 However, recognizing the need for targeted advocacy related to
menopause is only the beginning.
This paper provides an overview of what menopause is and how it affects menopausal
employees at work. It further reviews the current state of jurisprudence related to the civil rights
of menopausal employees and suggests an alignment for menopause equity with the menstrual, or
period, equity movement. Section I provides a brief description of menopause and the common
cultural stigmas faced by persons who enter menopause. Additionally, Section I provides an
overview on how menopause and its related symptoms interferes with work for many menopausal
employees. Section II analyzes ways in which current law has failed to address employment
discrimination for menopausal workers. First, it examines judicial treatment of menopause under
the ADA with respect to courts’ failure to recognize menopause as a cognizable disability. Next,
it reviews judicial holdings where plaintiffs who have experienced discrimination related to
menopause have made Title VII claims of discrimination on the basis of sex. Section III provides
a brief review of intersectional menopause and age discrimination. Section IV discusses

Brooks Land, Battle of the Sexes: Title VII’s Failure to Protect Women from Discrimination against Sex-Linked
Conditions, 53 GA. L. REV. 1185, 1193-94 (2019). But see source cited supra note 4, U.S.C. § 2000e (The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act amended Title VII to expressly prohibit discrimination due to pregnancy by employers with fifteen
or more employees).
7
Naomi Cahn, Justice for the Menopause: A Research Agenda, 2021-05 U. Va. PUB. L. AND LEGAL PAPER SERIES 1
(2021).
6
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menopause equity as an extension of the menstrual, or period, equity movement, including the
emerging view that the menstrual equity “tent” includes menstruators who are facing,
experiencing, or have reached menopause.8 Finally, this article concludes by summarizing the need
for focused advocacy, targeting legislation and regulatory policy, as well as raising awareness, to
address the needs of menopausal persons, especially employees.

I.

What is Menopause and How Does it Affect Menstruators?

All persons who can menstruate (“menstruators”), and who do not die prematurely, will
experience menopause during their lifetime, either due to a medical issue or, more commonly, as
a natural consequence of aging. Clinically, menopause is defined as the permanent cessation of
menstruation.9 The years leading up to that point are called the menopausal transition or
perimenopause, where menstruators may experience changes in their monthly cycle and other
symptoms.10 The menopausal transition often begins between ages forty-five and fifty-five, with
an average age of fifty-one; it lasts an average of seven years but can last up to fourteen years. 11
Regardless of age, menopause may be triggered by a hysterectomy or surgical removal of the
ovaries.12 For simplicity, this paper uses the term ‘menopause’ to encompass the experience of
menstruators throughout the menopausal transition, beginning with the onset of perimenopause
through the point of clinical menopause (twelve months after the last period) and beyond.
The symptoms most frequently associated with menopause are hot flashes, sleep

8

Bridget J. Crawford, Margaret E. Johnson, Marcy L. Karin, Laura Strausfeld, & Emily Gold Waldman, The Ground
on Which We All Stand: A Conversation About Menstrual Equity Law and Activism, 26 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 341
(2020).
9
What is Menopause?, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-menopause (last visited Oct. 29,
2019).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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disturbances, urinary complaints, sexual dysfunction, and mood changes. 13 Additionally,
perimenopause is often characterized by erratic and perhaps heavy menstrual bleeding.14 The age
at onset, occurrence, and severity of menstruation symptoms can vary significantly from one
menstruator to the next.15
The medical community has addressed menopause primarily as a condition to be addressed
by drugs—i.e., hormone replacement therapy (“HRT”).16 HRT became widely regarded as the best
way to “control” menopause after gynecologist Robert Wilson (“Wilson”) published his 1968 bestseller Feminine Forever.17 The book characterizes menopause as a “disease” resulting from
estrogen deficiency.18 Wilson advocates for treating menopause with estrogen replacement, with
the implied promise that “women” will never age.19 A study of HRT used between 1988-94 found
that 44% of postmenopausal women reported having used some form of HRT. 20 Also, clinical
trials have found significant risks associated with HRT including heart disease, stroke, blood clots,
and breast cancer. 21 However, HRT continues to be marketed as a “pseudo-youth elixir” and preys
on the stigmas associated with natural aging, despite HRT no longer being considered the only
path to addressing the symptoms of menopause.22

Dealing with Symptoms of Menopause, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G, https://www.health.harvard.edu/womenshealth/dealing-with-the-symptoms-of-menopause (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
14
Supra note 9.
15
Id.
16
Supra note 7.
17
See, e.g. Judith Houck, “What do these Women Want?” Feminist Responses to Feminine Forever, 1963-1980, BULL.
HIST. MED. 103 (2003).
18
Id. (citing Judith Houck, “What do these Women Want?” Feminist Responses to Feminine Forever, 1963-1980, 77
BULL. HIST. MED. 103 (2003)).
19
Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 1 (citing not all menstruators are “women”; trans men and non-binary persons may
also be menstruators.)
20
Kate Brett & Yinong Chong, Hormone Replacement Therapy: Knowledge and Use in the United States, NAT. CTR.
HEALTH STAT. 7 (2001).
21
Hormone therapy: Is it right for you?, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/menopause/in-depth/hormone-therapy/art-20046372 (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
22
Cahn, supra note 7, at 2.
13
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A. Menopause is Uniquely Stigmatized in Western Culture
The word menopause is often avoided in Western society, in preference of a euphemism
‘like the change’. A key myth about menopause is that it is “a time in woman’s life when she goes
batty for a few years, subject to wild rage and deep depression, and after it she mourns her lost
youth and fades into the woodwork.”23 Sheehy relates the story of a woman experiencing early
menopause who was shunned by her friends for mentioning her struggles with the “change.” 24 The
woman explained to Sheehy that “[p]eople wouldn’t relate my problems to menopause because
that would automatically classify them as old.” 25 Feminist Germaine Greer speculated that
menstruators do not speak of menopause because cultural norms have forced them into denial and
perhaps it occurs as a non-event for many menstruators.26
Until the early 1900s, a woman’s child-bearing years—regarded as her primary function—
and life span were approximately the same.27 As human life spans became longer, more women
lived longer and their economic value to society increased. 28 However, historically, menopause
has been used under the law against women.29 For much of the twentieth century, the so-called
menopause defense labeled any symptoms suffered by females at mid-life as “menopausal. 30 In
their article “Mirrors and Gavels,” Hoffman and Klein discuss the use of the “menopause defense”
through the 20th century to “cast female plaintiffs in a negative light and as a way to persuade
courts and juries that the woman suing them was already a damaged person and thus entitled to

23

Sheehy, supra note 3, at 5.
Id. at 7.
25
Id.
26
Phyllis T. Bookspan & Maxine Klein, On Mirrors and Gavels: A Chronicle of How Menopause was Used a Defense
Against Women, 32 IND. L. REV. 1276 (1999).
27
Id. at 1281.
28
Id. at 1283.
29
Id. at 1267 (emphasis added).
30
Id. at 1271.
24
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little or no recovery.”31 This defense was asserted in civil actions, primarily by men in maledominated courtrooms, to “devalue female plaintiffs, cast blame upon them, and attempt to deny
[them] compensation or other remedies.” 32 This approach at law was the result of intersectional
sexism and ageism because its central premise was that a woman approaching middle-age was
“either mentally ill, physically ill, or both.”33
Societal biases against menstruators are reflected in the lack of advocacy and resources
dedicated to addressing “women’s issues” related to female reproduction, including menopause,
menstruation, miscarriage, endometriosis, and others.34 In the United States (“U.S.”), menopause
advocacy by not-for-profit organizations is gaining significant traction. However, it is not
especially visible or widespread yet. Organizations concerned with aging, such as the American
Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”), and other women’s organizations actively promote
education for women, employers, and others on menopause—e.g., what it is, its symptoms, and
available treatments. But these organizations stop short of meaningful advocacy for legislation and
policy changes that protect menopausal persons. Also, the human resources community has taken
steps to educate employers but stopped short of advocating for meaningful accommodations.35
More recently, the movement for period equity has begun to include menopause equity in
advocacy.36 However, a concerted search for organized U.S. advocacy specifically directed at

31

Id. at 1271-72.
Id. at 1271.
33
Id. at 1272.
34
Margaret E. Johnson, Menstrual Justice, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2 (Nov. 2019). See also Keelyn Friesen, Nonpassage of the women’s health equity Act: Inaction may lead to cancerous results, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1
(Fall 1993).
35
Sheryl Kraft, Menopause in the Workplace: How Women Can Cope, NEXTAVENUE (Nov. 29, 2019),
https://www.nextavenue.org/menopause-workplace-women-cope. See also Dana Wilkie, How to Accommodate
Menopause at Work, SOC. FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (May 26, 2015); Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Coleman v.
Bobby Dodd Inst., 13 (No. 71-13023).
36
Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, The Fight for Menstrual Equity Continues in 2021, MARIE CLAIRE (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/a35280718/menstrual-equity-2021-goals; see also, Brief for Petitioner32
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menopause issues, comparable to other issues related to female biology like pregnancy,
breastfeeding rights, and menstrual justice, fails to reveal any menopause-focused group or
movement other than World Menopause Day which received little attention in the U.S..37
The U.S. has shown little public policy response to the needs of menopausal persons, other
than funding for clinical research around drugs and other therapies. Despite the thousands of bills
and resolutions introduced in the last five sessions of Congress, only a small handful even include
the word ‘menopause’. All such references are incidental rather than related to the purpose of the
proposed legislation.38
B. Symptoms During the Menopausal Transition Often Interfere With Menopausal Workers’
Ability to Perform at Their Usual Levels
As the U.S. population ages and workers delay retirement, it is estimated that sixty-one
million U.S. workers are either experiencing, or will soon experience, menopause at work.39
Menopausal workers may be reluctant to complain to their employers or ask for help out of fear of
being seen as old, less competent, less able, or lazy.40 A 2015 study found that untreated vasomotor
symptoms, characterized by hot flashes, night sweats, and flushes, accounted for lost work

Appellant Coleman v. Bobby Dodd Inst., 13 (No. 17-13023) (the petitioner’s brief argued that discrimination due to
“premenopause” was prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex.).
37
An internet search turned up only one U.S. hit: Fox affiliate in Indianapolis, Indiana broadcasted a story on support
of World Menopause Day by a local company that designs and sells pajamas for women experiencing night sweats;
see World Menopause Day helps bring recognition for women’s hygiene, FOX59 WEB, https://fox59.com/news/worldmenopause-day-helps-bring-recognition-for-womens-hygiene (last visited Mar. 21, 2021). There is no evidence that
Congress considered adopting a resolution for the day, despite its usual practice of recognizing specific days to support
certain groups, diseases, conditions, etc..
38
Menopause, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/117/hr2007 (last visited Oct. 29, 2019 6:00 PM);
see Stephanie Tubbs Jones Uterine Fibroid Research and Education Act of 2021, H.R. 2007, 117th Cong. (2021)
(recognizing that infertility is a widespread problem that affects populations of diverse ages, races, ethnicities, and
genders cited in H.Res. 338, 117th Cong. (2021)).
39
Hilary Weaver, Menopause Discrimination Affects Millions of American Women, SUPERMAJORITY ED. FUND (Feb.
7, 2020), https://supermajorityedfund.com/2020/02/menopause-discrimination-affects-millions-of-american-women.
40
Supra note 35.
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productivity as well as a significant rise in health claims. 41 Despite the apparent costs of
unaddressed menopause, U.S. employers have not been proactive in addressing the needs of a
significant portion of the workforce.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2018, the civilian labor force included 14.6
million women aged fifty through fifty-nine, representing about 9.4% of the total. 42 Further, in a
survey of 400 women between the ages of fifty through fifty-nine by AARP, 84% of the
respondents said their menopause symptoms interfere with their lives; 12% said their symptoms
interfere “a great deal” or were debilitating. 43 The clear inference here, given the reported impact
of menopause symptoms and the representation of women of menopausal age in the workforce, is
that a significant segment of the labor force is experiencing menopause at work and for some, their
symptoms are adversely affecting their ability to perform their jobs.
The impact on job performance posed by menopause symptoms can vary significantly by
menstruator and perhaps by the circumstances of their job. For example, hot flashes would not
significantly impair an employee who has a private office and can have closed-door privacy or
control over their office temperature. On the other hand, an employee in a job where they must
wear a constrictive uniform without the ability to take breaks could become so uncomfortable that
they could not perform their job. Similarly, mood changes vary greatly in their severity and
amongst menstruators. Jobs that require close work with others could be assessed poorly as not
being team players.

The Immense Burden of Menopausal Symptoms, MGH CTR. FOR WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH (May 4, 2015),
https://womensmentalhealth.org/posts/the-immense-burden-of-menopausal-symptoms.
42
Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population by Age, Sex, and Race, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat03.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
43
Jenifer Wolff, What Doctors Don’t Know About Menopause, AARP (Aug./Sept. 2018),
https://www.aarp.org/health/conditions-treatments/info-2018/menopause-symptoms-doctors-relief-treatment.html.
41
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In a survey published by the National Institutes of Health, women reported pervasive
negative views on aging, particularly regarding the effects of menopause on their body image and
“the sense of irrelevance and invisibility that many women experienced as they matured.” 44
Among the four primary themes that emerged from the survey was “a plea for recognition of the
need to maintain a contributory role in society.” 45

II.

The ADA’s Failure to Address Discrimination Due to Menopause

In claims of menopause discrimination under the ADA, the courts have consistently held
that age-related menopause is not a disability. The ADA, as amended by the Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate
against disabled individuals as candidates for employment, or in the course of their employment. 46
Under the ADA, a qualified individual is one who can perform the “essential functions of the job,”
with or without accommodation. 47 This section first provides an overview of disability under the
ADA and reviews relevant case law where courts have denied ADA disability status for age-related
menopause. Next, this section addresses the issue of accommodations broadly in terms of
menopausal employees’ needs.
A. Courts Have Generally Failed to Recognize Naturally Occurring Menopause as an ADA
Disability

44

Sara M. Hofmeier, et al, Body Image, Aging, and Identity in Women Over 50: The Gender and Body Image (GABI)
Study,
U.S.
NAT’L
LIBR.
OF
MED.
NAT’L
INST.
OF
HEALTH
(July
11,
2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5215963 (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
45
Id.
46
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
47
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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The ADA was enacted on July 26, 1990 with final regulations issued in 1991.48 From that
time until enactment of the ADAAA in 2008, the Supreme Court decided twenty ADA cases,
where five were centered around the ADA’s definition of disability. 49 The Court significantly
narrowed the definition of disability in four of the five disability definition cases. 50 In response to
the Court’s action, Congress enacted the ADAAA which broadened the definition of disability to
make it easier for an individual seeking protection under the ADA to establish that they had a
disability eligible for coverage. 51 While courts’ pre-ADAAA denial of disability status for
menopause is not distinguished from its treatment of most other conditions where disability status
was sought and denied, the broadening intent of the ADAAA has resulted in coverage of disability
for severe menopause symptoms.52
Under the ADA, as amended, it is unlawful for a covered employer to discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability, defined under the three-prong test as someone who has:
“[A] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; has a record of such impairment; or is regarded as
having such an impairment.”53 Additionally, the ADA further provides that “[a]n
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially
limit a major life activity when active.” 54 Under the ADA, major life activities
“include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing

Timeline of the Americans with Disabilities Act, AMS. WITH DISABILITIES ACT NAT’L NETWORK,
https://adata.org/ada-timeline (last visited Feb. 21, 2022).
49
The
History:
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act
(ADA),
THRIVE
TOGETHER,
https://www.thrivetogethertoday.org/post/ada-the-history (last visited June 14, 2021).
50
Id.; see also Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527, 521-22 U.S.
516 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams,
534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002).
51
Pub. L. 101-336 (examining the Americans with Disabilities Act), Focusing on Ways to Determine the Proper Scope
of its Coverage: Hearing Before the Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab., & Pension, 110th Cong. (2008), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg43702/html/CHRG-110shrg43702.htm.
(U.S.
Senate
participants in the roundtable addressed concerns that the legislation’s impact fell short of expectations because of
narrow interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court.)
52
Id.
53
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C).
54
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).
48
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hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”55
Under the ADA, an employer is only required to provide accommodation if the worker’s
disability qualifies for ADA coverage.56 However, the disability status of age-related menopause
has generally not been given favorable treatment by the courts because the courts have only
acknowledged the loss of reproductive ability as the major life activity affected by menopause.57
At the same time, courts have allowed claims to proceed where younger workers have lost their
fertility due to early onset of menopause.58 Although the courts have left a small opening to
consider severe symptoms related to age-related menopause, they have generally held that
menopause per se is not a disability under the ADA and have ignored the impact of menopausal
symptoms on many of the major life activities enumerated in the ADA—e.g., insomnia and sleep;
“brain fog” and thinking; and working in general. 59 In cases based on specific symptoms of
menopause, the courts have focused on menopause broadly rather than the specific facts of cases
where menopause has manifested with debilitating symptoms that required accommodation.60
By way of example of courts’ refusal to consider age-related menopause to be a disability,
several cases where courts have rejected claims related to menopause symptoms are summarized.
McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., an example of a pre-ADAAA case where the court granted
summary judgment to the employer, held that menopause is not a disability under the ADA.61 In
this case, the plaintiff’s suit included a discrimination claim under the ADA because she was forced

55

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
57
Cahn, supra note 7, at 7.
58
Id. at 7-8.
59
McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D. Minn. 1998); see also Klein v. Dep’t of Children
and Families Servs., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
60
McGraw, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1021; Klein, 34 F. Supp. 2d. at 1372.
61
McGraw, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
56
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to resign for performance issues related to her menopause. 62 The court applied the McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting analysis, which requires a plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case by showing: “(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action
giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”63 The court notes that the Supreme Court
in Bragdon v. Abbott had held the inability to have children is an ADA disability; however, the
court distinguished from Bragdon, stating “[t]he Court takes judicial notice of menopause as an
entirely normal consequence of human aging.” 64 The court’s holding indicates a predisposition
against menopause as a disability, even if the broader definition had been in effect.
Similarly, in Klein v. Dep’t of Children and Families Services, another pre-ADAAA case,
the Southern District of Florida addressed the question of “whether complications of menopause,
which temporarily interfere with a woman’s ability to satisfactorily perform employment tasks, is
a statutory handicap or disability for which an employer must make reasonable
accommodations.”65 Iris Klein, a State of Florida Youth and Family Counselor, requested an
exception to her employer’s requirement that counselors report to work by 8:00 a.m. because of
issues related to menopause, including nausea, insomnia, and bleeding, that made it difficult for
her to begin work early in the morning.66 The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim of disability,
calling her issue “morning lethargy,” and holding that it did not limit a major life activity because
she was able to function after 9:30 a.m..67 The court allowed that a “complicated menopause may
62

McGraw, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 (noting that the plaintiff brought action against her employer, alleging
discrimination on the basis age, ADA violations, breach of contract and failure to grant leave under the Family Medical
Leave Act). See also id. at 1019.
63
Id. at 1020, citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64
McGraw, 21 F. Supp. 2d. 1017 at 1021 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (finding the inability to have
children as a cognizable ADA disability related to an AIDS case).
65
Klein v. Dep’t of Children and Families Servs., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
66
Id. at 1368-69.
67
Id. at 1371-72.
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be…disabling [sic] under the ADA,” but held that Ms. Klein’s menopause did not rise to the level
of disability.68 Although the court left the door open for severe symptoms, it held “[m]enopause,
generally, is not a handicap [n]or disability.”69 These holdings imply that, notwithstanding the
ADAAA’s broadening of the definition of disability, the court manifested a bias against finding
menopause to be a disability.
The general bias against age-related menopause is also demonstrated in Saks v. Covey, a
case related to medical benefits coverage for infertility treatment, where the court rejected the
premise that conditions resulting from the natural aging process could never be considered a
disability while allowing that youthful infertility is likely a disability. 70 Further demonstrating the
prevalence of the judicial view that menopause is not a disability, the Southern District of New
York cited McGraw’s holding that menopause is not a disability, while adding that the holding
represented “a proposition that enlightened women have been espousing for centuries.” 71 In Saks,
a complaint completely unrelated to menopause, the court unnecessarily and without basis, implied
that “enlightened women” would not “want” menopause to be considered a disability. 72
Following the broadening effect of the ADAAA, the court has treated early-onset
menopause more favorably. In Mullen v. New Balance Athletics, Inc., the District Court for Maine
ruled “a reasonable jury could find…an impairment…sufficient to place the plaintiff abruptly into
menopause at the age of 35” and thus, supported an ADA accommodation claim.73 In this case,
the plaintiff was pressured to resign from her position due to an emotional outburst that followed

68

Id.
Id. at 1372.
70
See generally, Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Mullen v. New Balance Athletics, Inc., 2019 WL 958370 (D. Me. 2019) (ruling against the plaintiff because,
although there was an ADA disability, there was no request for accommodation).
69
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receiving critical feedback from a company trainer.74 After bursting into tears, Ms. Mullen
informed the trainer that she was experiencing hot flashes and emotional reactions as a result of a
recent hysterectomy. 75 The Mullen court allowed the possibility of disability only for premature
menopause where a woman loses her ability to have children. 76 Illustrating the general bias against
older menopausal individuals, the court held that only early menopause was a disability, holding
“a reasonable jury could find that an impairment … sufficient to place the plaintiff abruptly into
menopause at the age of 35” and, thus, supported an ADA claim. Disability due to inability to have
children while in traditional child-bearing age range was seen as an impairment of a major life
activity.77
In another post-ADAAA case, the Eastern District of Arkansas court acknowledged that
pre-ADAAA rulings against menopause as an ADA disability were not controlling and the issue
must be considered anew. 78 The court in Chipman v. Cook stated that the plaintiff failed to present
evidence that her symptoms related to menopause “‘substantially limit’ one or more of the major
life activities of [an] individual” and therefore, there is an issue of material fact as to whether her
symptoms are an ADA disability.79 However, the court goes on to state “[i]t is undisputed that Ms.
Chipman’s menstrual cycle ‘did not affect her ability to see, hear, eat, sleep, speak, breathe, learn,
read, think, or communicate with others.’”80
Menopause as a disability has also not received favorable treatment under state law, either.
In Sipple v. Crossmark, a menopausal employee made a claim under the California Fair

74

Id. at 3-5.
Id. at 4.
76
Id. at 10.
77
Id. at 10, 12.
78
Chipman v. Cook, 2017 WL 1160585 8 (E.D. Ark. 2017).
79
Id.
80
Id.
75
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Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) that she was forced to resign after being improperly
denied a dress code accommodation recommended by her physician. 81 The California court held
that the plaintiff failed to allege and prove that her condition was a disability as defined under
FEHA.82 Despite ADAAA’s significant changes to the definition of disability, the court stated
“…no case law suggests that menopause qualifies as a disability either under the FEHA or the
ADA.”83 Instead, the court cited pre-ADAAA cases to support its holding, stating:
This [c]ourt is not willing to recognize menopause as a disability per se. Menopause
is a natural progression over time…. While the effects of menopause may constitute
a disability if it is shown to affect a body system as defined by the FEHA, and if
shown to sufficiently limit a major life activity, menopause is not recognized by
this [c]ourt to be a disability per se under the FEHA.84
Although the court appears to leave an opening for some menopausal symptoms to qualify
for disability status, there is nothing in the court’s statement that indicates it would expect to see
any claim that qualifies as an eligible disability under either state or federal law.
B. The types of Requested Accommodations to Address Severe Menopause Symptoms of Are
Likely to be Found Reasonable if Menopause Was Recognized as a Disability
The ADA requires accommodations for qualified workers who have an ADA disability,
stating:
It is unlawful for a covered entity not to make reasonable ADA accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or
employee with a disability, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.85
Under the ADA, there are three categories of reasonable accommodations, described as
modifications or adjustments to one or more of the following: (1) the job application process; (2)
the work environment, or manner or circumstances “under which the position held or desired is
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customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential
functions of that position; or (3) that enable an employee (with a disability) to “enjoy equal benefits
and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without
disabilities.”86 An employer may be excused on the basis of undue hardship if providing an
otherwise reasonable accommodation to a qualified worker causes the employer to incur
significant expense or poses significant difficulty.87
Guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) describes a
reasonable accommodation as one that appears to be “feasible” or “plausible” and also “effective
in meeting the needs of the individual.”88 However, there is little case law that addresses
accommodations for disabilities related to menopause because, as discussed above, courts do not
regard menopause as a qualified disability. In the absence of the courts holding that a worker
qualifies for accommodations due to a menopause disability, the courts do not reach the issue of
whether particular accommodations for menopause are reasonable or would pose an undue
hardship on the employer.
Employers can accommodate workers experiencing symptoms of menopause by relaxing
uniform requirements, allowing unscheduled breaks to recover from emotional outbursts caused
by hormonal fluctuations, and intermittent paid leave to recover from acute symptoms, and other,
similar accommodations.89 As discussion of menopause becomes more common in mainstream
media, human resource professionals and women’s advocacy groups are urging employers to
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develop policies and practices to accommodate workers who experience symptoms that affect their
work.90 Although it may take time to yield results, human resource experts’ advice includes
changes in corporate culture and updates to policies as well as simple, inexpensive
accommodations to make menopausal workers more comfortable.91 Examples include the
following: providing fans or access to more ventilated areas, easy access to drinking water and
restrooms, and flexible working hours.92 These types of accommodations could become more
common in workplaces if severe symptoms of menopause were recognized as an ADA disability.
With respect to schedule flexibility, EEOC guidance requires a covered employer to allow
an employee with a disability to work a modified or part-time schedule (absent undue hardship).93
The EEOC guidance states:
A modified schedule may involve adjusting arrival or departure times, providing
periodic breaks, altering when certain functions are performed, allowing an
employee to use accrued paid leave, or providing additional unpaid leave. An
employer must provide a modified or part-time schedule when required as a
reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, even if it does not provide such
schedules for other employees.94
To request an accommodation, individuals need only inform their employer that they need
adjustments or changes at work for a reason related to a medical condition.95 In requesting an
accommodation, the individual is not required to refer to the ADA or use the words “reasonable
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accommodation.”96 Despite the relatively low regulatory barriers to requesting accommodations,
the cultural stigmas associated with menopause may suppress employees’ willingness to make
such requests.97 For example, a survey conducted in the United Kingdom on women experiencing
menopausal symptoms found that nearly one-third had taken sick leave because of their symptoms,
but only one-quarter felt comfortable telling their supervisor that the leave was related to
menopausal symptoms.98
The unwillingness of courts to recognize menopause as a disability per se and the stifling
effect of cultural stigmas associated with menopause prevents the exploration of reasonable
accommodations for menopausal symptoms. Paradoxically, success in achieving disability status
poses the risk of greater stigmatization of menopause in the workplace. This can be avoided by
shifting the focus from menopause in general as a disability to narrowly focusing on severe
symptoms and the relatively small cohort that suffers from them.

III.

Menopause Discrimination on the Basis of Sex Under Title VII

Claims for relief due to menopause-related employment discrimination have not found
favor in the courts, despite the text of Title VII and the fact that menopause is a sex-related
condition.99 Acknowledging that menopause discrimination is “because of sex” seems obvious
because it is a condition unique to persons born with female reproductive organs.100 Title VII
provides that it is unlawful for an employer to do the following:
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“[T]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions,
or
privileges
of
employment,
because
of
such
individual’s…sex…or…to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s…sex….”101
The following sections provide a discussion of the problems inherent in requiring a
similarly situated male comparator for discrimination claims based on menopause and how Title
VII has failed to expansively cover the full range of female reproduction, despite its amendment
by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) to encompass “female reproduction” as a general
sex-related trait.102
A. “Similarly Situated” Male Comparators Miss the point Because Menopause is Uniquely
Related to Female Biology
If there is no direct evidence of discrimination, Title VII disparate treatment claims on the
basis of sex typically require a plaintiff to prove that their treatment differed from that of similarly
situated members of the opposite sex, based on the burden-shifting test established by McDonnell
Douglas.103 While Mr. Green’s complaint in McDonnell Douglas was based on racial
discrimination in the employer’s decision to deny him an offer of employment, the Court’s holding
in favor of Mr. Green’s claim has created the test by which the burden of proof of discriminatory
intent shifts from the plaintiff-employee to the defendant-employer.104 The first part of the
McDonnell Douglas three-part test requires the plaintiff to establish a four-pronged prima facie
case of discrimination, including the following: (1) the plaintiff/complainant belongs to a protected
class; (2) they applied for and were qualified for the particular position; (3) they suffered an
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adverse employment action (i.e., were not hired or were terminated); and (4) the employer treated
similarly situated employees, who are not members of the protected class, more favorably.105 Once
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
non-discriminatory reason for the action.106 Next, assuming the defendant can articulate a
satisfactory reason, the plaintiff has an opportunity to rebut the employer’s stated reason as pretext
for a discriminatory motive.107
In a Title VII claim related to female physical traits, the fourth prong, comparing the
treatment of similarly situated employees, is often the most difficult to establish because biological
features unique to female reproduction generally have no comparable conditions for males. 108 This
lack of a comparator has not prevented the courts from adapting the last prong of McDonnell
Douglas to create a “male-comparator” requirement, requiring a “because of sex” claim for an
employee regarded as female to allege they were treated less favorably than a similarly situated
male.109 Plaintiffs have struggled with imperfect comparators in “because of sex” claims related to
pregnancy (standing and lifting requirements), lactation (need for breaks and privacy), and
menstruation (incontinence versus menstruation, etc.); however, male comparators for menopause,
and the associated severe symptoms of hot flashes, erratic periods, are simply non-existent.110
In the Middle District of Georgia, Coleman v. Bobby Dodd Institute, Inc. garnered
significant attention from national media and provided a rallying point for the menstrual-equity
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movement; however, the case was arguably about menopause discrimination.111 Ms. Coleman, a
911 dispatcher at a private employer, was terminated because of damage caused by her
perimenopausal menstrual flow.112 In addressing the claim that Title VII, as amended by the PDA,
prohibits discrimination related to female reproductive processes, the court noted “a non-frivolous
argument can be made that it is unlawful for an employer to treat a uniquely feminine condition,
such as excessive menstruation, less favorably than similar conditions affecting both sexes, such
as incontinence.”113 However, the court went on to say that “[h]ere Coleman’s excessive
menstruation was related to premenopause [sic], not pregnancy or childbirth.”114 The latter
statement seemingly implies that the court would reject an argument that menstruation and
menopause should be afforded the same protections as pregnancy and childbirth-related conditions
and, even if they were, would only be protected if a male comparator was available.
In dismissing the case, the court rejected Coleman’s argument that she was terminated
because of her sex.115 Instead, the court held that Coleman was not treated less favorably than if
someone of either sex had caused similar damage due to any condition, such as a male with
incontinence.116 In short, Coleman was not treated less favorably because she suffered a “uniquely
female condition.”117 In fact, the court went so far as to say that Coleman was not fired because of
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her excessive bleeding but because of the damage caused by that bleeding and her failure to control
it with feminine hygiene products.118 Here, the court has created a judicial double-bind, requiring
the plaintiff to plead that a uniquely feminine condition was the reason for the firing but making it
seemingly impossible to establish a prima facie case for discrimination related to a female
biological process (by holding the reason for the firing is legitimate, even if the underlying cause
was uniquely female).
B. Cultural Discomfort Around Menopause Makes it More Difficult to Establish
Discrimination and Harassment Based on Pejorative Comments by Supervisors
The courts have generally treated comments regarding an employee’s menopausal status
as “stray” remarks and therefore, lacking in particularity and temporal proximity to support a claim
of discrimination. Some examples are:
•

A fifty-two year-old-woman alleged discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII
and age where her employer referred to her as “la menopausica” (the menopausal one),
among other age and gender-related insults.119 Here, the court held that the comments
lacked “the temporal proximity and specificity required to surmise they were directly
connected to any particular adverse action” taken against the plaintiff.120

•

A plaintiff claimed that her employer’s decision not to promote her was based on
impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII, where a person who interviewed her
for the position described a building managed by the employee as “Menopause Manor,”
indicating gender animus. 121 Here, the court granted summary judgement for the
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employer, finding the phrase “Menopause Manor” was potentially a description of a
group that did not include the employee and that the phrase was “vague and ambiguous,
and not clearly indicative of a discriminatory animus towards women.” 122
In contrast, in Bailey v. Henderson, the court held that a supervisor’s direction to another
employee not to intercede in a conflict because it was “just some [B]lack women going through
menopause,” along with other sexist statements, provided a basis for a reasonable juror to find the
conduct was “based on sex” in a claim of hostile work environment. 123 However, it is not clear if
the holding would have been the same without the other sexist or racist comments alleged in the
complaint.124
C. PDA’s Language Encompasses the Full Range of Female Reproductive Issues, Its
Protections Have Not Been Extended to Those in The Last Stage of The Female
Reproductive Cycle: Menopause
The PDA was enacted by Congress to make it clear that discrimination based on
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” is a form of discrimination on the basis of
sex that is prohibited by Title VII. 125 Specifically, the text of the PDA states:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to,
“because of” or “on the basis” of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of
this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 126
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According to the EEOC, the number of complaints under the PDA has increased
substantially in the years since its enactment, with the majority of charges including allegations of
discharge based on pregnancy. 127 Other charges include “allegations of disparate terms and
conditions of employment based on pregnancy, such as closer scrutiny and harsher discipline than
that administered to non-pregnant employees,” and issues related to medical records and
examinations.128
By clarifying that discrimination “on the basis of sex” included, but was not limited to,
“because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” the PDA
clarified that the “because of sex” protection includes uniquely female reproductive
characteristics.129 The plain language of the PDA seems to say that it encompasses all issues related
to biological female reproduction, not just pregnancy, and would also apply to allegations arising
from menstruation, miscarriage, abortion, fertility, menopause, and other uniquely female
conditions.
However, an emerging legal question is whether Title VII, as amended by the PDA,
encompasses menopause. At this time, there is little reported case law.130 As discussed previously
in Coleman v. Bobby Dodd Institute, Inc., the lower court ruled in favor of an employer who fired
a female employee who soiled company property due to heavy, erratic menstruation related to
perimenopause.131 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that “[t]he PDA was enacted to extend protection
to conditions linked to sex,” including “premenopause.”132
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Here, the plaintiff argued that “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions are not
the sole conditions that might constitute prohibited sex discrimination, but rather, constitute a nonexhaustive list of forms that sex discrimination takes,” including menopause.133 However, the case
was settled before the appeals court had the chance to rule.134 While the settlement forestalled a
definitive ruling on the issue of PDA coverage of menopause, it suggested a means for future
plaintiffs to argue for a broad interpretation of the PDA and for it to include menopause-related
discrimination.135 Nonetheless, no U.S. court has taken up the matter to date.136

IV.

Age Discrimination

Cultural stereotypes associated with female aging, especially in Western societies,
underscore the challenges of pursuing legal claims for intersectional sex and age discrimination
because they are pervasive.137 Because naturally occurring menopause, or where there is no
surgical or medical intervention to cause early onset menopause, occurs for most menstruators in
middle age, menopause discrimination is arguably per se discrimination based on age. While there
have not been cases that address this particular issue as the basis for relief, it is worth noting that
there is a common thread in which plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination on the basis of sex due to
menopause often include complaints of age discrimination, and vice versa. 138
A. The ADEA May Provide a Basis for Intersectional Age-Sex Discrimination Claims
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The ADEA makes differential treatment of employees aged forty and over unlawful and
suggests another avenue for plaintiffs to pursue their legal claims related to menopause
discrimination. Specifically, the ADEA states:
It shall be unlawful for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
age….139
B. Intersectional Age-Sex Discrimination is Difficult to Prove based on Circumstantial Actions
Determining whether a specific act of discrimination is attributable to stereotypes related
to age or to gender highlights the challenges of addressing this intersectional legal claim. 140 Claims
of discrimination based on insidious motives like race, sex, and age can be difficult to prove in the
absence of comparators that shift the burden of proof to the employer. In the absence of a
comparator, often challenging to establish, plaintiffs must rely on direct or circumstantial actions
and statements by decision-makers to demonstrate the employer’s discriminatory motive. 141 This
concept of ‘stray remarks’ can be crucial in supporting assertions of intersectional claims for sex–
age discrimination for menopause. Menopausal workers may find themselves the butt of workplace
jokes related to temperature issues or the perceived end of their usefulness. 142
However, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that ‘stray remarks’
alone are insufficient to shift the burden to the employer and to prove that the employer’s decisions
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were based on legitimate criteria. 143 While this case addressed a claim of discrimination on the
basis of sex, some lower courts have applied Price Waterhouse by adopting Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s doctrine of “stray remark” and requiring biased comments (even those pertaining to
non-sex based claims) to be both made by a decision-maker and connected to a decision relating
to the plaintiff’s employment as prerequisite for their consideration as evidence of discriminatory
motive.144 As an example of the application of this doctrine, the Third Circuit established three
factors to determine whether a “stray remark” is probative of discrimination:
(1) the relationship of the speaker to the employee and within the corporate
hierarchy; (2) the temporal proximity of the statement to the adverse employment
decision; and (3) the purpose and content of the statement. These factors must be
considered in total in light of the nature and context in which the comment was
made.145
There have been mixed rulings where pejorative comments about “menopausal women”
have formed the basis for age discrimination or hostile work environment claims. In Mesias v.
Cravath, Swaine and Moore LLP, the court held a supervisor’s statement that he was “tired of
working with menopausal women” lacked sufficient nexus to the disciplinary action to be
probative of discriminatory intent. 146
In Mesias, a terminated employee sued for discrimination on the basis of sex, age, and
national origin under Title VII, the ADEA, and several New York state laws. 147 The Southern
District of New York Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
for, among other things, age and gender discrimination.148 The plaintiff asserted a series of
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interactions and acts by the employer that led up to her termination and claimed that she had been
treated differently than other employees.149 Her claims of age and gender discrimination were
based on several interactions where her supervisor made negative comments, directed at her and
in the presence of other employees, about working with “menopausal women.” 150 The court held
there was insufficient nexus between the remarks and the adverse action, despite the fact that the
comments were made in the context of interactions that led up to her termination.151 Further, the
court held that, although her supervisor made these comments in the course of performance-related
discussions, the complaint failed to allege that the remarks were “related to the decision-making
process” that resulted in the plaintiff’s termination.152
Notwithstanding the paucity of case law addressing the intersection of age and sex in
employment discrimination, this remains an area where future plaintiffs may find success in
pleading intersectional Title VII/ADEA claims by showing how the provisions of both laws apply
to instances of intersectional discrimination.

V.

Menopause and the Menstrual Equity Movement

“Menstrual equity” is a relatively young phrase, coined in 2015 by Jennifer Weiss-Wolf.153
This phrase was used to discuss and frame the burgeoning policy agenda that addresses the “farreaching societal importance of and need…to address the safety, affordability, and availability of
menstrual products for everyone who needs them.”154 In the five years since the birth of the
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available

at:

movement, its advocates have achieved significant traction and seen legislative change to mandate
menstrual access and affordable products in numerous states and cities.155
As the menstrual equity movement continues to gain traction and support, it is broadening
its scope to include other issues related to female biology while, at the same time, identifying
vulnerable cohorts for targeted advocacy. Given the mere fact that menopause is defined in terms
of the cessation of menstruation and that all living menstruators will eventually experience
menopause, “menopause equity” is a natural extension of the menstrual equity movement. 156 The
discussion that follows summarizes the argument for pursuing menopause equity through the
existing framework for menstrual equity, rather than seeking to build a new movement and risking
a dilution of, and reducing the effectiveness of, each individual movement. Further, the persons
who would benefit from menstrual equity are the same as those who, someday, are likely to face
menopause discrimination.
A. The Menopause Equity Movement’s Early Success Has Led Advocates to Broaden Its Scope
The early focus of the menopause equity movement has been on the “tampon tax,” or sales
taxes on menstrual products imposed by states and cities where other health and hygiene items are
exempt from sales taxes.157 However, as the movement has grown, its advocacy has expanded to
address access to menstrual products for incarcerated women and students in schools; issues
related to breaks and hygiene issues faced by low-wage workers, unique issues affecting
marginalized menstruators, including persons of color, homeless persons, and transgender and
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non-binary menstruators; and classification of menstrual products for reimbursement by taxexempt Health Savings or Flexible Spending Accounts.158
The menopause equity movement’s early focus on the more tangible aspects of
menstruation, such as access to menstrual hygiene products, does not speak to the needs of
menopausal former menstruators who no longer need access to such products. However, the
cultural biases and shame related to menstruation and menstruators, which the movement
confronts, do not stop when menstruation ends and therefore, equity for menopause is, in fact,
menstrual equity.159 As Margaret Johnson notes in her 2019 paper on menstrual justice, “[s]ociety
expects menstruators to be solely and invisibly responsible for their menstruation without
recognizing it as part of the necessary reproductive life cycle.” 160 Professor Johnson’s description
could equally apply to persons experiencing perimenopause.
B. Menopause Equity Advocates Recognize Menopause as a Next Phase For The Movement
Looking forward on behalf of the menstrual equity movement, Ms. Weiss-Wolf has
identified the “other M-word” as one of the next priorities for the menstrual equity movement. 161
In a recent opinion piece, she notes that there are three generations that are now, or will be soon,
facing real time issues perimenopause: “powerhouse” baby-boomers; GenXers, like herself; and
millennials. In support of the natural alignment of menopause equity with the menstrual equity
movement, she notes “[m]uch like we’ve shown with the movement for menstrual equity,
menopause can also be a compelling catalyst for better, more representative lawmaking—from

158

Id. at 171-73.
See also Johnson, supra note 1.
160
Id. at 2.
161
Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, The Fight for Menstrual Equity Continues in 2021, MARIE CLAIRE (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/a35280718/menstrual-equity-2021-goals.
159

30

how we consider the equitable provision of health care to protections from workplace
discrimination.”
Given the common constituency amongst menstruators, menstruators in perimenopause,
and former menstruators in menopause, and shared focus on removing discriminatory barriers
related to menstrual concerns, advocates interested in menopause equity should seek to align with
the menstrual equity movement and further the menstrual equity movement by welcoming this
closely aligned opportunity for advocacy.

V. Conclusion
Issues related to workplace discrimination appear to be unlawful according to the plain
language of existing civil rights protections afforded by the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA.
However, to date, the courts have not interpreted these statutes in a way that protects menopausal
workers. While legal advocates should continue to build on arguments made to provide such
protections (e.g., arguing for PDA coverage of perimenopause in Coleman), it is time to break the
silent taboo of menopause through focused advocacy, like that of the burgeoning menstrual equity
movement, to dispel the myths and biases that have plagued menopausal menstruators for
centuries.
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